Medicane Daniel - Setembro 2023

Precisamente. Nem sequer a manutenção as segurava. Mas a vigilância em tempo real na situação meteorológica prevista teria sido fundamental, e não me parece que custasse muito, bastavam dois observadores na área da barragem em comunicação tlm a entidades na cidade e alguma sirene de alarme. Será que era muito difícil ter implementado isto em um dia? :disgust:

Enquanto o Ocidente for uma fabrica de armas para vender, nada de desenvolvimento sério se consegue nesses países.
 
Sept 15 (Reuters) - "They knew."

When hydrologist Abdul Wanis Ashour began researching the system of dams protecting the eastern Libya port town of Derna 17 years ago, the peril facing residents was already no secret, he said.

"When I gathered the data, I found a number of problems in the Derna Valley: in the cracks present in the dams, the amount of rainfall and repeated floods," he told Reuters. "I found also a number of reports warning of a disaster taking place in the Derna Valley basin if the dams were not maintained."

In an academic paper he published last year, Ashour warned that if the dams were not urgently maintained, the city faced a potential catastrophe.

"There were warnings before that. The state knew of this well, whether through experts in the Public Water Commission or the foreign companies that came to assess the dam," he said. "The Libyan government knew what was going on in the Derna River Valley and the danger of the situation for a very long time."

This week, the "catastrophe" that Ashour had warned of in the pages of the Sebha University Journal of Pure & Applied Sciences, unfolded just as he said it would.

On the night of Sept. 10, the Derna Wadi, a dry riverbed most of the year, burst the dams built to hold it back when rains pour into the hills, and swept away much of the city below. Thousands of people are dead and thousands more still missing.

Abdulqader Mohamed Alfakhakhri, 22, said he made it to the roof of his four-storey building and was spared, watching as neighbours on their own rooftops were washed out to sea: "holding their phones with lights on and shaking their hands and screaming."

With the bodies still being gathered from underneath flattened buildings and the seashore where they have been washing up, many Libyans are angry that warnings were ignored that could have possibly prevented the worst disaster in the country's modern history.

"A lot of people are responsible for this. The dam wasn't fixed, so now it's a disaster," said Alwad Alshawly, an English teacher who had spent three days burying bodies as a rescue volunteer, in an emotional video uploaded to the internet.

"It is human error, and no one is going to pay a price for it."

Spokespeople for the government in Tripoli and the eastern administration which governs Derna did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

CONTRACTS​

Authorities tried to repair the dams above Derna as far back as 2007, when a Turkish company was awarded a contract to work on them. In his report, hydrologist Ashour cites an unpublished 2006 study from the Water Resources Ministry on "the danger of the situation."

But in 2011, Libya's long-serving ruler Muammar Gaddafi was toppled in a NATO-backed uprising and civil war, and for years after Derna was held by a succession of militant Islamist factions, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State.

The Turkish company, Arsel, lists a project on its website to repair the Derna dams as having begun in 2007 and been completed in 2012. The company did not answer its phone or respond to an emailed request for comment.

Omar al-Moghairbi, spokesperson for a Water Resources Ministry committee investigating the dams' collapse, told Reuters the contractor had been unable to complete the works because of the security situation, and had not returned when requested.

"Budgets were allocated but the contractor was not there," he said.

Even if the renovation work had been carried out, the dams would have failed, Moghairbi said, because the water level after Storm Daniel's deluge exceeded the structure's capacity, although the damage to Derna would not have been as severe.

Two officials at Derna municipality also told Reuters work on the dams contracted before Gaddafi's fall had been impossible to carry out afterwards because the city was occupied by Islamic State and besieged for several years.

Even after the city was recaptured by the administration running the east of the country, work did not resume.

In 2021, a report by Libya's Audit Bureau cited "inaction" by the Water Resources Ministry, saying it had failed to move forward with maintenance work on the two main dams above Derna.

The report said that 2.3 million euros ($2.45 million) had been earmarked for maintenance and rehabilitation of the dams but only part of the funds were deducted. It did not say whether those funds had been spent, or on what.

STORM WARNING​

Critics of the authorities say they are to blame not only for failing to repair the dams, but for leaving residents of Derna in harm's way as the storm approached.

Speaking on the pan-Arab al-Hadath channel, Derna mayor Abdulmenam al-Ghaithi said on Friday he "personally ordered evacuating the city three or four days before the disaster."

However, if such an order was given, it does not appear to have been implemented. Some residents reported hearing police tell them to leave the area, but few seem to have left.

Other official sources told residents to stay: a video posted by the Derna Security Directorate on Sunday announced a curfew from Sunday night "as part of the security measures to face the expected weather conditions".

Even as the catastrophe was unfolding on Sunday night, the Water Resources Ministry issued a post on its Facebook page telling residents not to worry.

"The dams are in good condition and things are under control" it said. The ministry spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the post.

The head of the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, Petteri Taalas, said on Thursday that in a country with a functioning weather agency, the huge loss of life could have been avoided.

"The emergency management authorities would have been able to carry out evacuation of the people. And we could have avoided most of the human casualties."

FAILED STATE​

Apportioning blame is never simple in Libya, where dozens of armed factions have waged war on-and-off with no government having nationwide authority since Gaddafi fell.

The internationally recognised Libyan government based in the capital Tripoli in the west of the country has no sway in the east, under a rival administration controlled by the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Hafter.

In Derna, the situation is even more troubled. Haftar's forces captured it from the Islamist groups in 2019 and still control it, but uneasily.

Libya's problem is not a lack of resources. Despite 12 years of chaos it is still a comparatively wealthy country, sparsely populated and pumping out oil that yields a decidedly middle-income per capita GDP above $6,000.

It has a decades-long history of massive engineering projects, above all on managing water in the desert. Gaddafi's Great Manmade River, for example, brings water some 1,600 km (1,000 miles) from aquifers deep under the Sahara to the coast.

But since Gaddafi's fall, the oil wealth has been disbursed among competing groups that control the administrative apparatus, becoming almost impossible to trace.

Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, head of the Tripoli government, on Thursday blamed negligence, political divisions, war, and "lost money" for uncompleted work on the dams.

In the eastern-based parliament in Benghazi, speaker Aguila Saleh sought to deflect blame from authorities, describing what happened as an "unprecedented natural disaster" and saying people should not focus on what could or should have been done.

In Derna, residents have known about the danger posed by the dams for generations, said history teacher Yousef Alfkakhri 63, who rattled off the years of smaller floods dating back to the 1940s. But the terror of Sunday night was incomparable.

"When the water started flowing into the house, me and my two sons with their wives escaped to the roof. The water was faster than us and flowing between the stairs," he recalled.

"Everyone was praying, crying, we saw the death," he said, describing the rushing water as sounding "like a snake."

"We lost thousands in all the wars in the past ten years, but in Derna we lost them in one day."

Additional reporting by Tom Perry, Angus McDowall, Maya Gebeily, Laila Bassam, Tarek Amara, Emma Farge and Mariana Sandoval; Writing by Peter Graff Editing by Frank Jack Daniel

Unificação do que já foi anteriormente publicado.
 
Última edição:
Terias uma opinião diferente se passasses a noite na primeira barragem e a fonte de luz mais intensa à tua disposição ser algo deste género:

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Acrescento que a precipitação se calhar foi tão intensa que nem poderias sair do carro. Sendo assim, que utilidade terias tido?
Provavelmente tens razão, mas não é por isso que deixo de acreditar que algo podia ter sido feito e não foi feito por razões que ainda falta investigar completamente, para além das razões naturais, políticas, sociais, etc. Nunca vou aceitar que baixar os braços é a única atitude possível face a uma tragédia anunciada como esta.
 
- Nenhuma barragem de aterro é desenhada para resistir ao galgamento. Independentemente do seu estado de conservação, um galgamento significativo destruiria qualquer barragem deste tipo;
- Os descarregadores de superfície das barragens são normalmente desenhados para períodos de retorno entre 1 000 e 10 000 anos. Dada a falta de registos históricos e presentes, deve ser extremamente complicado avaliar o período de retorno do evento, tal como terá sido difícil definir o valor do caudal de dimensionamento no projecto da barragem;
- A falta de manutenção do circuito do descarregador de cheia aparenta ser a principal causa evitável da tragédia. Nas imagens de satélite verifica-se um grande matagal na zona da descarga a jusante da barragem, o que não deveria acontecer. Provavelmente, passaram vários anos sem passar água naquele circuito, enquanto a sua situação se deteriorava e a secção útil ia ficando cada vez mais constrangida;
- Descarregadores de superfície sobre a estrutura da barragem não são recomendáveis em barragens de aterro, uma vez que seria necessário interromper a estrutura de aterro com uma estrutura de betão, e uma ligação entre estes dois elementos que garanta a estanquidade e a segurança estrutural é extremamente complicada;
- A alternativa de descarregador em canal de encosta seria bastante onerosa, tendo em conta que as margens aparentam ser bastante rochosas. A solução de descarregador destas barragens parece-me totalmente adequada, independentemente de poderem eventualmente estar subdimensionadas;
- A onda de cheia causada pela rotura de uma barragem de aterro costuma ser relativamente suave, por vezes não superior à cheia milenar, uma vez que a rotura progride lentamente;
- Provavelmente, a chegada da onda da rotura da barragem de montante ao atingir a de jusante causou uma rotura muito mais acelerada nesta última, terá sido este o mecanismo que potenciou a tragédia;
- Planos de monitorização de barragens em países do terceiro mundo praticamente não existem. A Guerra Civil não será a maior responsável pela sua inexistência, basta dizer que em Portugal, há menos de 10 anos atrás, ainda estavam a ser desenvolvidos Planos de Emergência para muitas das grandes barragens;
- Mesmo que houvesse Plano de Emergência/ Monitorização, a barragem de jusante está localizada às portas da cidade. Se fosse em Portugal estaria dentro da ZAS (Zona de Auto-Salvamento), em que cada pessoa é responsável por se pôr a salvo após soarem as sirenes. Não havia nada que as autoridades pudessem fazer após se verificar que a barragem estaria em perigo;
- Era impossível evacuar uma cidade com centenas de milhões de habitantes, principalmente durante a ocorrência de um medicane num país em guerra.
 
Para além de a desproteção civil da Líbia não ter meios nem planos, para onde aconselhariam evacuar?

Os povoamentos a oeste de Derna também tiveram inundações (e avisos) e a leste só há terriolas no meio do deserto (quase certamente) sem capacidade para albergar algumas dezenas de milhares em pouquíssimo tempo. Para sul, além das elevações, é deserto.

Entre o caos certo e - na altura - uma probabilidade razoável de não acontecer nada de especial...
 
Última edição:
Tem que mostrar os papéis, obviamente.

Despite the stresses, repairs were minimal. In 1998, the Libyan government commissioned a study that revealed cracks and fissures in the dams, said Attorney General Sadiq al-Soor.

Nearly 10 years later, a Turkish company was finally contracted to repair the dams, the prosecutor added. But the government dragged its feet in paying, and the project got underway only in 2010, Mr. al-Soor told reporters on Friday.

 

"The #Derna tragedy is linked to the collapse of the two dams in the mountains behind the town. One is in the city’s outskirts (seen here, now broken) but this local resident tells me it was not full that night. It was the collapse of dam some 30kms away that triggered the diaster".

Reforça a ideia de que não estando a cair precipitação fora do normal na própria cidade, quer os moradores quer as autoridades terão inferido que a montante nada se passaria de extraordinário. Estivesse a chover muito mais na própria cidade, e a albufeira da barragem secundária já cheia, talvez as decisões tivessem sido outras. Parece que tudo se conjugou para a tragédia perfeita...

Lição para todos em todo o mundo: as redes de estações e monitorização em tempo real serão cada vez mais imprescindíveis para avisar de eminentes tragédias.
 
Ambos os governos paralelos estavam ao corrente. Hoje em dia nenhum país, especialmente na periferia de uma das regiões do globo com maior desenvolvimento na previsão meteorológica, é ignorante neste aspecto, qualquer entidade, qualquer pessoa com um telemóvel e ligação à internet pode saber o que está previsto. A Líbia não dependia do seu serviço meteorológico para saber o que vinha a caminho, nenhum dirigente de qualquer governo podia ignorá-lo.
As previsões e o trajecto anterior da tempestade eram conhecidos, pretender que as autoridade líbias, sejam elas quais forem, não tinham conhecimento é ridículo.
A previsão foi ignorada ou quem quis actuar de acordo foi silenciado, quem sabe se com um propósito não declarado, mas talvez se venha a saber.
 

Abdulqader Mohamed Alfakhakhri, 22, said he made it to the roof of his four-storey building and was spared, watching as neighbours on their own rooftops were washed out to sea: "holding their phones with lights on and shaking their hands and screaming."

With the bodies still being gathered from underneath flattened buildings and the seashore where they have been washing up, many Libyans are angry that warnings were ignored that could have possibly prevented the worst disaster in the country's modern history.


"A lot of people are responsible for this. The dam wasn't fixed, so now it's a disaster," said Alwad Alshawly, an English teacher who had spent three days burying bodies as a rescue volunteer, in an emotional video uploaded to the internet.

"It is human error, and no one is going to pay a price for it."

Spokespeople for the government in Tripoli and the eastern administration which governs Derna did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

"
[1/4]A view shows the damaged areas, in the aftermath of the floods in Derna, Libya, September 13, 2023, in this picture obtained from social media. Marwan Alfaituri/via REUTERS/File photo Acquire Licensing Rights
The report said that 2.3 million euros ($2.45 million) had been earmarked for maintenance and rehabilitation of the dams but only part of the funds were deducted. It did not say whether those funds had been spent, or on what.

STORM WARNING​

Critics of the authorities say they are to blame not only for failing to repair the dams, but for leaving residents of Derna in harm's way as the storm approached.

Speaking on the pan-Arab al-Hadath channel, Derna mayor Abdulmenam al-Ghaithi said on Friday he "personally ordered evacuating the city three or four days before the disaster."

However, if such an order was given, it does not appear to have been implemented. Some residents reported hearing police tell them to leave the area, but few seem to have left.

Other official sources told residents to stay: a video posted by the Derna Security Directorate on Sunday announced a curfew from Sunday night "as part of the security measures to face the expected weather conditions".

Even as the catastrophe was unfolding on Sunday night, the Water Resources Ministry issued a post on its Facebook page telling residents not to worry.

"The dams are in good condition and things are under control" it said. The ministry spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the post.

The head of the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, Petteri Taalas, said on Thursday that in a country with a functioning weather agency, the huge loss of life could have been avoided.

"The emergency management authorities would have been able to carry out evacuation of the people. And we could have avoided most of the human casualties."


FAILED STATE​

Apportioning blame is never simple in Libya, where dozens of armed factions have waged war on-and-off with no government having nationwide authority since Gaddafi fell.

The internationally recognised Libyan government based in the capital Tripoli in the west of the country has no sway in the east, under a rival administration controlled by the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Hafter.

In Derna, the situation is even more troubled. Haftar's forces captured it from the Islamist groups in 2019 and still control it, but uneasily.

Libya's problem is not a lack of resources. Despite 12 years of chaos it is still a comparatively wealthy country, sparsely populated and pumping out oil that yields a decidedly middle-income per capita GDP above $6,000.

It has a decades-long history of massive engineering projects, above all on managing water in the desert. Gaddafi's Great Manmade River, for example, brings water some 1,600 km (1,000 miles) from aquifers deep under the Sahara to the coast.

But since Gaddafi's fall, the oil wealth has been disbursed among competing groups that control the administrative apparatus, becoming almost impossible to trace.

Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, head of the Tripoli government, on Thursday blamed negligence, political divisions, war, and "lost money" for uncompleted work on the dams.

In the eastern-based parliament in Benghazi, speaker Aguila Saleh sought to deflect blame from authorities, describing what happened as an "unprecedented natural disaster" and saying people should not focus on what could or should have been done.

In Derna, residents have known about the danger posed by the dams for generations, said history teacher Yousef Alfkakhri 63, who rattled off the years of smaller floods dating back to the 1940s. But the terror of Sunday night was incomparable.

"When the water started flowing into the house, me and my two sons with their wives escaped to the roof. The water was faster than us and flowing between the stairs," he recalled.

"Everyone was praying, crying, we saw the death," he said, describing the rushing water as sounding "like a snake."

"We lost thousands in all the wars in the past ten years, but in Derna we lost them in one day." "
 
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Isto não é apenas um desastre "natural". Vejam as imagens.

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Unificação do que já foi anteriormente publicado.

:palmas: Excelente texto; logo coloco a tradução deste texto em português.

Para além dos factores naturais, está mais que explicito que as intervenções externas armadas apenas serviram para desestabilizaram a segurança e a paz na região e nada contribuíram para o desenvolvimento local, antes pelo contrário... Como tudo poderia ter sido prevenido e ter acontecido de outra forma!

"As ajudas internacionais para a reconstrução vão começar a 'chover', e a 'inundar' os bolsos de muitos responsáveis, talvez daqueles mesmos que anteviram essa possibilidade através da sua própria inacção."
Esta opinião não deve estar muito longe da verdade.

Vão ver que não vão faltar por lá empresas dos países que andaram a fazer bombardeamentos... Hipocrisia do ocidente.
 
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